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I. INTRODUCTION
In July of 2001, a storm system drenched southern West Virginia with
heavy rain and caused flash flooding in many counties.1 The flooding devas-
tated many communities, forcing citizens either to relocate or rebuild, and esti-
mated damages are approximately $500 million.2 As a result, roughly 3,500
people sued various coal, timber, railroad and other landholding companies for
damages sustained during that flood.3
The plaintiffs alleged that the companies altered the landscape, increas-
ing the water runoff and worsening the flood damage.4 However, unlike other
surface water alteration cases, the scale of damages and large number of plain-
tiffs (some not living adjacent to any defendant's property) make this lawsuit
unique.5 As a result, these cases will force West Virginia courts to analyze new
surface water issues, such as what theories of recovery are available to plaintiffs
and what extent the defendants owe a duty of care to non-adjacent landowners.
Additionally, the complexity of this litigation will force courts to confront many
surface water alteration issues more explicitly than they have in the past.
The implications of this lawsuit will not be limited to the July 8, 2001
floods. Actually, more than 600 plaintiffs have already filed lawsuits against
many of the same companies for damages sustained during floods on May 2,
2002.6 Also, lawyers involved in those cases expect to see lawsuits from 2003
and 2004 flooding as well.7 Holding coal, oil, gas, timber, and other landhold-
ing companies liable for damages every time it floods could be financially ruin-
ous for many of the defendants and it could worsen the economic conditions in
an already depressed part of West Virginia.8
See Ken Ward Jr., Court Tries to Narrow Flood Case, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Sept. 2, 2004,
at A10.
2 Toby Coleman, Court to Rule on Act of God, Man; Lawyers Argue Over Responsibility for
Flooding in 2001, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 10, 2004, at C1.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Generally, West Virginia surface alteration cases involved only adjacent landowners. See,
e.g., Morris Assocs., Inc. v. Priddy, 383 S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 1989). "Generally, under the rule of
reasonable use, the landowner, in dealing with surface water, is entitled to take only such steps as
are reasonable, in light of all the circumstances of relative advantage to the actor and disadvantage
to the adjoining landowners ..... Id. at 773 (emphasis added).
6 See Coleman, supra, note 2, at 21.
7 See Juliet Terry, Lawyer Pours Controversy on Flood Case, THE STATE JOURNAL, Nov. 19-
25, 2004, at 21.
8 For instance, due primarily to the economic effects of deindustrialization, McDowell and
Wyoming counties alone, both of which were severely affected by the July 8, 2001 floods, have
lost more than 70% of their population during the last 50 years. PLANNING, July 2004, Vol. 70,
Issue 4, p.6 2 . In addition, loss of jobs is primarily blamed for the fact that bankruptcy filings
[Vol. 108
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This Note will analyze the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals's
decision in In re Flood Litigation.9 Specifically, it will discuss four issues in
depth: (1) the two theories of recovery discussed in In re Flood Litigation, the
nuisance theory and the reasonable use rule, and the relationship between them;
(2) the factors that courts may use to define reasonable use; (3) the problems
regarding causal apportionment and the divisibility of damages; and (4) how
courts will define the duty of care element. This Note will primarily argue that
when a court determines whether the defendants owed a duty of care to the
plaintiffs, it should factor social, public and economic policy into its analysis.1°
Particularly, when determining duty, courts should balance the plaintiffs' needs
to recover for their property damage against the economic implications of hold-
ing the defendants liable, the general populations' need for the resources that the
defendants produce, the jobs that the defendants provide in an economically
depressed part of West Virginia, and the impact that holding the defendants li-
able would have on utility prices.
Part H of this Note discusses the three predominant surface water doc-
trines in the United States, as well as the history of the surface water doctrine in
West Virginia. Several key issues raised in In re Flood Litigation are discussed
in Part III. Specifically, Part III will discuss those factors that the court indi-
cated should be considered in the reasonable use test; the Court's insinuation
that the plaintiffs have a cause of action under the theory of private nuisance;
and finally, the distinction between causation and the apportionment of damages
that is raised in the opinion. Part IV then argues that West Virginia courts
should consider social, public and economic policy when determining duty, and
that among these considerations should be the economic consequences that ex-
panding the defendants' duty would have on defendant companies and to the
general public. Finally, Part V summarizes this author's proposed solution to
soared to a record 6,326 in Southern West Virginia for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2003,
breaking the previous record of 6,162. State Bankruptcies Soar, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Aug. 21,
2003, at C2.
However, the natural resources industry continues to be a vital economic industry in West Vir-
ginia, particularly in the southern part of the state. In 2003, 8,923 people were directly employed
by coal companies alone in the southern counties of Boone, Kanawha, Mingo, Logan, Wyoming,
McDowell, and Raleigh, and coal producers in those same counties contributed over $7,450,000
to the state in severance tax for that same year. See WEST VIRGINIA COAL ASSOCIATION, COAL
FACTS 7-16 (2004), http://www.wvcoal.com/resources/pdfs/coalfacts2004.pdf. In addition, Oil
and Gas producers paid over $2,276,240 in severance taxes to the state of West Virginia.
See WEST VIRGINIA STATE TREASURER'S OFFICE, DISTRIBUTION OF OIL AND GAS SEVERANCE
TAXES, available at http://www.wvtreasury.com/sites/money/taxtaxfiles/Oil%20and%2OGas/
taxdist oil and-gas.htm. Overall, more than 21,700 West Virginians were employed in the Natu-
ral Resources Industry in West Virginia in 2003. George Hammond, Long-Term Forecast Update
2004: Executive Summary, 10 W. VA. UNIV. BUS. & ECON. REV. 3 (2004).
9 In re Flood Litig., 607 S.E.2d 863 (W.Va. 2004).
10 Coleman, supra note 2, at C I. Justice Maynard noted during oral arguments that the court
would have to form rules that would allow juries to weigh the flood losses against the "economic
activity" created by the defendant companies. Id.
2005]
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accommodate meritorious claims while protecting the defendants from limitless
liability.
II. HISTORY OF SURFACE WATER DOCTRINES IN THE COMMON LAW
A. Three Predominant Surface Water Doctrines: The Common Law Rule,
Civil Law Rule, and Reasonable Use Rule
In order to deal with the problems caused by the alteration of surface
water, American jurisdictions initially adopted two doctrines that were almost
diametrically opposed: the common law or common enemy rule [hereinafter the
common law rule], and the civil law rule.1" Under the common law rule, "each
landowner was entitled to take what steps he pleased, on his own land, to dis-
pose of surface water without liability for any adverse consequences to his
neighbors., 2 Conversely, under the civil law rule, neither landowner could
alter the natural flow of surface water over his or her respective properties.'
3
The common law rule had the advantage, particularly in undeveloped areas, of
promoting improvements on the land, while the obvious negative effect of the
rule was the potential unjust consequences to injured neighbors. 14 On the other
hand, the civil law rule, although avoiding inequitable results, had the tendency
to preclude development of property.' 5  Thus, in an effort to avoid the rigidity
of the common law and promote the development of land, a hybrid approach
developed focusing on the reasonableness of the development when determining
liability.16 Under this hybrid approach, which became known as the reasonable
I Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Governing Interference With Drainage
of Surface Waters, 93 A.L.R.3d 1193, 1197 (1979).
12 Id. The common enemy doctrine or common law rule "provides that surface water is an
outlaw and a common enemy against which anyone may defend himself, even though by so doing
injury may result to others." Halverson v. Skagit County, 983 P.2d 643, 651 (Wash. 1999) (inter-
nal quotations omitted).
13 See Fairchild, supra note 11, at 1216. Under the civil law rule,
adjoining landowners are entitled to have the normal course of natural drain-
age maintained, with the lower owner bound under a servitude to accept and
dispose of the water which naturally came to his land from above, but, recip-
rocally, he was not entitled to have the normal drainage artificially changed or
increased.
Id.
14 See id.
15 See id.
16 See id. at 1197-1199.
The erosion incident to attempts to apply the extreme doctrines to constantly
arising 'hard cases' soon led to the adoption of exceptions to both rules, which
tended to draw them both toward a more flexible middle position and to give
the courts considerable leeway in adjusting the rights of the parties in the light
of particular circumstances.
[Vol. 108
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use rule, the value of improvements to the property benefited by the diversion of
surface waters are weighed against the harm the water diversion caused other
property. 7 New Hampshire first interpreted the rule in 1862 in the case of Bas-
set v. Salisbury Manufacturing Company.'8 There, the Supreme Judicial Court
of New Hampshire rejected the common law approach's rigidity, and it rejected
the civil law rule for its tendency to prevent improvement of the land. 19 Instead,
the court fashioned a rule stating that one property owner could reasonably use
his or her own land provided that he or she did not interfere with the property
rights of others.2° Under Basset, any landowner who altered the surface water
on his or her land in such a way that injured another was liable for such damage
unless, under all the circumstances, the landowner's use was reasonable. 2' De-
spite the equitable balancing approach under this rule and the First Restatement
of Torts' strong promotion of the rule, Minnesota was the only other state to
formally adopt the reasonable use rule until midway through the twentieth cen-
tury.2 Instead, most states, much like West Virginia, adopted exceptions to
their respective surface water doctrines causing them to approach an intermedi-
ate rule actually resembling the reasonable use rule.23
Id. at 1216.
17 See James Lockhart, 16 C.O.A. 675, § 3 (2004).
18 43 N.H. 569 (1862). See also Fairchild, supra note 11, at 1216.
19 See Bassett, 43 N.H. at 573-577. Discussing the civil law rule, the court stated,
No land-owner has an absolute and unqualified right to the unaltered natural
drainage or percolation [of water] to or from his neighbor's land. In general it
would be impossible for a land-owner to avoid disturbing the natural percola-
tion or drainage, without a practical abandonment of all improvement or bene-
ficial enjoyment of his land.
Id. at 575.
Similarly, the court rejected the common law approach because such an approach completely
disregarded the property rights of others. Id. at 577.
20 Id. at 577. The court stated in Salisbury that whenever landowners disrupt the natural flow
of surface water on their property, "they are liable, unless the obstruction was caused by the rea-
sonable use of their own land or privilege; and the reasonableness of the use would depend upon
the circumstances of the case." Id. at 577.
21 Id.
22 Stanley V. Kinyon & Robert C. McClure, Interference With Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L.
REV. 891, 908 (1940); see also Sheehan v. Flynn, 61 N.W. 462, 465 (1894) (Minnesota adopted
the reasonable use rule).
23 Fairchild, supra note 11, at 1198.
20051
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B. Surface Water Doctrine in West Virginia
1. Pre Morris Associates, Inc. v. Priddy:24 The Common Law Rule
Early case law in West Virginia regarding the alteration of surface water
is "not a model of clarity. ' '25 In two of its earliest decisions, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals seemed to have adopted the civil law rule. In Gilli-
son v. Trustee,2 6 the court held that a city had a duty in making street improve-
ments to not change the course of surface water in a way that damaged the ad-
joining property. 27 Then, in Henry v. Ohio River Railroad Co., 28 the court held
that a railroad company was liable for constructing an embankment that caused
water to collect on the plaintiffs property.29 However, in Jordan v. City of
Brenwood,30 the court adopted the common law rule despite its earlier deci-
sions.31 The facts in Jordan were similar to those in Gillison. The plaintiff sued
a municipality for raising the street level grade and causing water that would
have gone elsewhere to flow onto her property.32 After analyzing both the com-
mon law and civil law rules, the court adopted the common law rule and held
that the city was not liable for increasing the surface water that flowed onto the
24 383 S.E.2d 770 (1989).
25 Id. at 772.
26 16 W. Va. 282 (1880).
27 Id. at 304. In Gillison, the plaintiff claimed that the city of Charleston damaged her prop-
erty when it installed surface water drains near her yard. Id. at 284. The plaintiff claimed that the
surface water drains prevented surface water from draining from her property. Id. The court held
that "where a city in grading its streets by cutting ditches and drains collects surface-water, and
casts it in a body upon the lot or ground of the proprietor below, unless it is so cast into a natural
water-course, the proprietor sustains a legal injury and may have his action therefore." Id. at 304.
In Gillison, the court discussed in length several opinions dealing with the diversion of
surface water, and it appeared to reject the common law rule.
A number of authorities . . . recognize the principle that individuals and mu-
nicipal corporations have the right to dispose of surface-water in any manner
they please, to prevent its flow from adjoining lands upon their premises, al-
though the result may be to flood the adjoining land, or to expel it, throw it
upon the lands of their neighbors, and in either case are not liable to an action.
These cases seem to lose sight entirely of the wholesome principle of ethics as
well as law, that a man may use his own property in any manner he pleases:
Provided, he does not thereby interfere with the rights of his neighbor.
Id. at 303 (italics in original).
28 21 S.E. 863 (W. Va. 1895).
29 Id. at 867.
30 26 S.E. 266 (W. Va. 1896), overruled by Morris Assocs., Inc. v. Priddy, 383 S.E.2d 770 (W.
Va. 1989).
31 Id. at 268. The court stated that Gillison "recognized the general [common law] rule infer-
entially", but it never stated that Gillison seemed to have rejected the common law rule. See id. at
267.
32 Id. at 266.
[Vol. 108
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plaintiff's lot. 33 However, recognizing the potential harshness of this rule, the
court created an exception to the common law rule which said that a landowner
could be liable if he or she caused surface water to flow onto another's property
by channeling it through drains, ditches, or culverts.34
After Jordan, the court continued to expand the exception to the com-
mon law rule in an effort to soften the rule. The court held that water that col-
lected in holes before spilling onto neighboring lands fit into the common law
rule exception announced in Jordan,35 that an embankment constituted a drain
or channel,36 and that Jordan did not apply when a city altered the street grade
and caused water from connecting streets to flow onto the plaintiffs property.37
In at least one case, the court's holding resembled the civil law rule and ignored
the common law rule altogether.38 In Tierney v. Earl,39 the court held that the
defendant was liable for raising the grade on his property in a manner that al-
tered the flow of water onto the plaintiffs property, 40 which was contradictory
to the holding in Jordan.4' In fact, Tierney caused West Virginia to be classified
as a civil rule state by at least one legal commentator.42 As a result, after Jor-
dan, in its effort to create equitable results without abandoning a rigid rule, the
court instead created unpredictable and often contradictory case law.4 3
2. Morris Associates, Inc. v. Priddy44 to the Present Day: The
Reasonable Use Rule
In 1989, in Morris Associates, Inc. v. Priddy, the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals overturned Jordan v. City of Brenwood and the com-
mon law rule for surface water liability and adopted the reasonable use rule.45
In Morris, the defendant installed a series of culverts on his property over which
33 Id. at 268
34 Id.
35 Kunst v. City of Grafton, 67 S.E. 74,78 (W. Va. 1910).
36 See Lindamood v. Bd. of Educ. of Williamson Indep. Sch. Dist., 114 S.E. 800, 800 (W. Va.
1922).
37 See Mason v. City of Bluefield, 141 S.E. 782 (W. Va. 1928).
38 See Tierney v. Earl, 172 S.E.2d 558, 560 (W. Va. 1970).
39 172 S.E.2d 558 (W. Va. 1970).
40 Id. at 560.
41 See generally Jordan v. City of Brenwood, 26 S.E. 266 (W. Va. 1896).
42 See Fairchild, supra note 11, at 1209 (stating that West Virginia recognized the civil law
rule in Tierney v. Earl).
43 See Morris Assocs., Inc. v. Priddy, 383 S.E.2d 770, 772 (W.Va. 1989) ("Admittedly, our
law with regard to a landowner's liability for altering the surface of his land to change the course
or amount of surface water.., is not a model of clarity.").
44 383 S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 1989).
45 See id. at 774.
2005]
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he constructed a parking lot.46 After a hard rainstorm, the culverts proved in-
adequate, and the plaintiffs adjacent parcel of land flooded. 47 The court thor-
oughly analyzed surface water law in West Virginia and concluded that the law
lacked clarity48 and was too inflexible to meet the demands of a modem soci-
ety.49 The court adopted the reasonable use standard, which states that when
dealing with surface water, a landowner is "entitled to take only such steps as
are reasonable, in light of all the circumstances of relative advantage to the actor
and disadvantage to the adjoining landowners, as well as social utility. 50 Addi-
tionally, the determination of reasonableness is a question of fact for the jury.51
Cases after Morris expand little on what constitutes "reasonable use." In
Whorton v. Malone,52 several defendants developed their respective properties,
which entailed clearing land, building roads, and constructing ditches and cul-
verts to deal with the surface water.53 The defendants' land bordered the plain-
tiff's, and after several rainstorms, the plaintiff experienced flooding on her
property which she claimed was exacerbated by the defendants' development.
54
The defendants argued that they were not liable because the surface water did
not originate on their property and that their actions were reasonable as their
intent was to solve their own water problems, not to injure their neighbors'
property.55 The court held though, that a defendant would not be shielded from
liability merely because the surface water originated elsewhere.56 In addition,
the court reasoned that unless there was a valid waiver of liability, landowners
could not claim that actions taken in altering the natural flow of water from their
land were reasonable just because they intended to protect their property and not
to harm any other property.57 However, because reasonable use is a fact specific
inquiry, the court refused to say whether the defendants' actions were a reason-
able use of their property, and it remanded the case to the lower court.58 One
other important factor in Whorton is the court's statement that under the reason-
46 Id. at 770-771.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 772-773.
49 Id. at 773.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 549 S.E.2d 57 (W. Va. 2001).
53 Id. at 62. It is important to note too that the court made it a point to state that such devel-
opment can "significantly change the amount of water the land can absorb during a storm, and the
amount of water that will run off." Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 62-63.
56 Id. at 63.
57 Id. at 64.
58 Id.
[Vol. 108
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able use standard, the principles of negligence would still control. 59 This means
that the defendants must owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs in order to be held
liable for the alteration of surface water.6°
In McCormick v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,6'1 Wal-Mart constructed a Su-
percenter between the plaintiffs land and another piece of property where the
town of Lewisburg had previously constructed storm water drains. 2 Following
the construction, the town's drainage system became inadequate, and the plain-
tiff's land began to flood after heavy rainstorms.63 The town of Lewisburg ar-
gued that no cause of action existed under the reasonable use test against non-
adjacent landowners, and because Wal-Mart was an intervening property, the
town should not be held liable. 64 However, the court rejected this argument and
held that a landowner was not immunized from liability merely because the wa-
ter passed over an intervening property before causing the injury.65 Rather than
base this conclusion under the traditional tort principles of duty or foreseeability
of the harm, the court instead relied on Whorton's holding that the origination of
water was irrelevant when determining liability in surface water alteration
cases.
66
The issue in McCormick was not the origination of the surface water,
but by phrasing the issue in this manner, McCormick might create an additional
duty for some landowners. In Whorton, the defendants constructed an inade-
quate culvert that increased the water runoff onto their neighbor's land, and then
argued that they should not be liable because the surface water did not originate
on their property.67 The Court correctly rejected this argument, recognizing that
if that were the law, no one would be liable for unreasonable surface alteration
because "[i]t is an inescapable fact of nature that, surface water originates else-
where." 68 On the other hand, in McCormick, the town constructed a drainage
system that was adequate until Wal-Mart built a store between the plaintiffs
59 Id. at61.
60 See Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 580 (W. Va. 2000). "In order to establish a prima
facie case of negligence in West Virginia, it must be shown that the defendant has been guilty of
some act or omission in violation of a duty owed to the plaintiff. No action for negligence will lie
without a duty broken." Id.
61 600 S.E.2d 576 (W. Va. 2004) (per curiam).
62 Id. at 578.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 579.
65 Id. But see Justice Maynard's dissenting opinion criticizing this aspect of the holding. Id. at
581 (Maynard, J., dissenting). Justice Maynard stated that landowners should only be held liable
for surface water run-off that damages an adjoining landowner. Id. at 582.
66 Id. at 579-80.
67 See Whorton v. Malone, 549 S.E.2d 57, 63 (W.Va. 2001).
68 See id. at 62. Surface water either "falls from the sky, comes up from a spring, or flows
from a higher grade to a lower one." Id.
2005]
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property and the drainage system.69 In Whorton, the actual construction was
unreasonable, 70 but in McCormick, it was not the construction itself that was
unreasonable, but the town's failure to upgrade its culvert after another party's
land use caused the culvert to become inadequate. 71 So, McCormick might cre-
ate the additional duty for some landowners to intervene and preemptively alle-
viate water problems caused by a third party's subsequent development of his or
her property.72
So, in decisions post-Morris, the court has held that the origination of
the surface water and intent are not determinative of liability and that the rea-
sonable use test is not limited to adjacent landowners. Beyond that there is little
analysis of what factors constitute a reasonable use of one's property.
C. Reasonable Use Rule in Foreign Jurisdictions
Although a fact specific inquiry, four basic factors have emerged in ju-
risdictions applying the reasonable use doctrine: (1) whether it was reasonably
necessary to alter the surface water flow; (2) whether reasonable care was taken
to avoid unnecessary harm; (3) whether the benefit resulting from the alteration
outweighed the gravity of the harm; (4) and whether any viable alternative ex-
isted for the course of action taken.7 3 Other courts have also considered to what
extent the natural flow of water was altered,74 the cost of any alternative means
of disposing of surface water,75 and whether or not the upper landowner acted in
good faith.76 One court has held that no matter how beneficial a diversion of
surface water may be, the defendant may still be required to pay damages if the
cost of bearing the harm is greater than the injured party should be required to
69 See McCormick, 600 S.E.2d at 577.
70 See Whorton, 549 S.E.2d at 63.
71 See McCormick, 600 S.E.2d at 577.
72 See id. at 582 (Maynard, J., dissenting).
73 Lockhart, supra note 17 §3.
74 See Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 516 n.5 (Haw. 1970). "The circumstances which may
be considered [under the reasonable use rule] include: the nature and importance of improvements
made, the reasonable foreseeableness of the injury, the extent of interference with the water, the
amount of injury done to other landowners compared to the value of the improvements." Id.
75 See Hall v. Wood, 443 So. 2d 834, 840 (Miss. 1983). "Where two methods of disposing of
excess waters are available to an upper landowner, one of which will damage to lower lands of his
neighbors and the other of which will not, the upper landowner, absent prohibitive expense, must
use the latter alternative." Id.
76 See Quist v. Kroening, 410 N.W.2d 5, 6 (Minn. App. 1987). In Quist, the defendants inten-
tionally built their house on lower ground to avoid building steps that could have posed difficul-
ties for their handicapped son. Id. at 7. Ten years after they built their house, the defendants
raised one portion of their lot three to four inches in order to better drain that part of their yard.
Id. However, after the defendants raised that comer of their lot, the plaintiff's lot began collecting
water. Id. The court indicated that the defendants acted in good faith, and that this was a reason-
able use of the defendants' land. Id.
[Vol. 108
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bear without compensation.77 As the current flood litigation proceeds in West
Virginia, these cases could be probative as to what factors the courts will con-
sider when determining whether the defendants' use of their land was reason-
able under the circumstances.
D. Restatement (Second) of Torts' Approach to Surface Water Alteration
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the "reasonable use rule" as
a rule of tort law applying the law of nuisance rather than the law of property.78
Under the Restatement's approach, the "invasion of one's interest in the use and
enjoyment of land resulting from another's interference with the flow of surface
water may constitute a nuisance. ' 7 9 A nuisance can be either private or public;80
"[a] public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public", 81 and "[a] private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of an-
77 See Pendergast v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787, 797 (1977).
[E]ven should alteration of the water flow by the defendant be 'reasonable' in
the sense that the social utility arising from the alteration outweighs the harm
to the plaintiff, defendant may nevertheless be liable for damages for a private
nuisance 'if the resulting interference with another's use and enjoyment of
land is greater than it is reasonable to require the other to bear under the cir-
cumstances without compensation.... The gravity of the harm may be found
to be so significant that it requires compensation regardless of the utility of the
conduct of the defendant.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 833 cmt. c (1979).
79 Id. A nuisance cause of action references the interest invaded and not the type of conduct
that subjects the actor to liability. Id. § 822 cmt. b. Failure to differentiate the two has led to
confusion as courts have attempted to distinguish between private nuisance and negligence. Id.
Thus, it is the land interest invaded that makes it a private nuisance cause of action, and it is the
actor's negligent conduct that subjects the actor to liability. Id. A private nuisance is not itself a
form of liability forming conduct. Id. at cmt. c.
80 Id. § 821A.
81 Id. § 821B. In order to recover for a public nuisance, one must have suffered a unique harm
that the general public did not suffer. Id. at § 821C. It is not enough that the plaintiff suffered the
same harm but to a more extreme degree than the general public. See id. at cmt. b. In other
words, if a public highway is obstructed and everyone who drives on the highway has to detour a
mile, there is no distinction between the person who has to drive on the highway and take the
detour every day and the person who drives on the highway only once a month. See id. Neither
can bring a public nuisance cause of action. See id. Therefore, it is unlikely that anyone in the
pending flood litigation would be able to bring a public nuisance cause of action because even
though some suffered more flood damage than others, everyone suffered at least some flood dam-
age.
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other's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land. ''82 In addition, to con-
stitute a private nuisance, the plaintiff must suffer "significant harm.,
83
Most surface water disputes arise under a private nuisance theory since
they usually involve damage to private property. Under the Restatement:
[o]ne is liable for a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct
is a legal cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private
use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either (a) inten-
tional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise ac-
tionable under the rules controlling liability for negligence or
reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or ac-
tivities.84
Intentionality is found when the actor "acts for the purpose of causing
[the invasion]", or if the actor "knows that [the invasion] is resulting or knows
[the invasion] is substantially certain to result from his [or her] conduct. ' 85
Thus, under the Restatement, if Party A intentionally alters the flow of surface
water onto Party B's property causing B damage, then the question becomes
whether A's use of his or her land was reasonable.86 In determining whether
conduct was unreasonable, a court weighs the gravity of the harm against the
benefits of the intentional invasion.87 If Party A unintentionally alters the flow
of surface water causing harm to Party B's property, then A may still be held
82 Id. § 821D.
83 Id. § 821F. Significant harm means more than a "slight inconvenience or petty annoy-
ance." The plaintiff must have suffered a "real and appreciable invasion of [his] interests before he
can have an action for either a public or a private nuisance." Id. at cmt. b.
84 Id. § 822.
85 Id. § 825. Examples of intentional conduct would be a person who builds a bonfire next
door to her neighbor's house when she knows that the smoke will blow into her neighbor's house,
or when a person dumps materials into a stream on her property which flows through her
neighbor's property and prevents the neighbor from utilizing the water. See id. at cmt. d., illus. 1-
2.
86 See id. § 822.
87 Id. § 826. The Restatement (Second) of Torts lists the following factors as important when
determining the gravity of harm from an intentional invasion of another's use of land:
(a) The extent of the harm involved; (b) the character of the harm involved;
(c) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment in-
vaded; (d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the
character of the locality; and (e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding
the harm.
Id. § 827. In determining the utility of the conduct, the Restatement lists these factors as impor-
tant: "(a) the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct; (b) the
suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality; and (c) the impracticability of preventing
or avoiding the invasion." Id. § 828.
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liable if his conduct was nonetheless negligent, reckless, or included an abnor-
mally dangerous activity.
88
III. INRE FLOOD LITIGATION: ANALYZING THE COURT'S OPINION
After the severe flooding that occurred in July 2001, roughly 3,500
plaintiffs sued various coal, railroad, timber, natural gas and other landholding
companies for negligently altering the surface water on their properties. 89 The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals issued an administrative order that
consolidated the estimated 3,500 cases into a massive lawsuit before a three-
judge mass litigation panel ["Flood Litigation Panel"]. 90 The Flood Litigation
Panel's duties were to develop and implement case management and trial meth-
odologies that would facilitate an efficient and timely trial (or trials) for the
mass litigation.9' The Flood Litigation Panel decided that the watersheds and
plaintiffs involved had different factual patterns, but all of the cases had similar
questions of law.92  The Panel then certified nine questions of law to the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. 93 The Court reformulated several of the
certified questions and provided answers and analysis for each of the questions
of law. 94 Upon remand, the Flood Litigation Panel will decide the most appro-
88 Id. § 822. An example of an unintentional invasion of land would be a landowner who
dumps waste material onto her land and unbeknownst to her, the waste material seeps into her
neighbor's groundwater and contaminates it. Id. § 825 cmt. d, illus. 3. However, if the landowner
subsequently learns that her waste material is contaminating her neighbor's property and she
continues to dump the material, the invasion becomes intentional. Id. at illus. 4.
89 Coleman, supra note 2, at C1.
90 Juliet Terry, More Than 600 Plaintiffs Sue for 2002 Flood Damages, THE STATE JOURNAL,
Nov. 19-25, 2004, at 21.
91 The Mass Litigation Panel is a panel of senior status circuit judges who are appointed by the
Chief Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. See W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 26.01(a)
(2005). The Panel's responsibilities consist of "developing and implementing case management
and trial methodologies for mass litigation", and to "make recommendations... on the transfer of
actions from one jurisdiction to another in order to facilitate any case management or trial meth-
odologies developed by the panel .... Id. at 26.01(b)(1), (3). "'Mass litigation' [is] defined as
two or more civil actions pending in one or more circuit courts ... involving common questions
of law or fact in 'property damage mass torts'." W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. at 26.01(c).
92 In Re Flood Litig., 607 S.E.2d 863, 869 (W. Va. 2004).
93 See id. For purposes of the proposed questions of law, the Panel assumed that the defen-
dants' activities caused an increase in peak water flow and thus caused the plaintiffs damage. See
id. at n.4.
94 The reformulated certified questions and answers are:
1.Whether adjacent and non-adjacent plaintiffs have a cognizable cause of ac-
tion based on allegations of unreasonable use of land under the balancing test
set forth in Morris Associates, Inc. v. Priddy, 181 W.Va. 588, 383 S.E.2d 770
(1989).
Answer: Yes.
2. Whether the plaintiffs have a cognizable cause of action upon the allegation
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priate trial method for the mass litigation given that the fact patterns are differ-
ent, but the reformulated questions of law will be controlling in all of the
roughly 3,500 cases.95 This Note, however, will focus on only those questions
pertaining to the reasonable use rule, the nuisance theory, the issues of causation
and the apportionment of damages, and the issue of duty.
that the defendants were negligent in the use of their land and therefore an-
swerable under the classic theory of negligence.
Answer: Yes.
3. Whether the plaintiffs have a cognizable cause of action upon the allegation
that the operation of extracting and removing natural resources is an abnor-
mally dangerous activity or that such activity produces ancillary conditions
that create an unreasonably high risk of flash flooding so that the defendants
are strictly liable to the plaintiffs for any damages caused by these activities.
Answer: No.
4. Do those plaintiffs herein who are riparian owners, by virtue of the fact that
they own property adjacent to a stream or through which a stream flows, have
a cognizable cause of action for interference with riparian rights based on the
fact that the stream's natural flow was increased by a flood or the water of the
stream overflowed and stood upon the riparian owner's land?
Answer: Yes.
5. In the event that a landowner conducts the extraction and removal of natural
resources on its property in conformity with federal law and with permits is-
sued by appropriate federal agencies, is any state court action preempted for
damages caused by surface waters accumulating and migrating on residential
property?
Answer: No.
6. Is compliance of a landowner in the extraction and removal of natural re-
sources on his or her property with the appropriate state and federal regula-
tions evidence in any cause of action against the landowner for negligence or
unreasonable use of the landowner's land if the injury complained of was the
sort the regulations were intended to prevent?
Answer: Yes.
7. Where a rainfall event of an unusual and unforeseeable nature combines
with a defendant's actionable conduct to cause flood damage, and where it is
shown that a discrete portion of the damage complained of was unforeseeable
and solely the result of such event and in no way fairly attributable to the de-
fendant's conduct, then is the defendant liable only for the damages that are
fairly attributable to the defendant's conduct?
Answer: Yes.
Id. at 879-80.
95 See W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 26.01.
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A. West Virginia Begins to Outline What Factors Will be Considered in the
Reasonable Use Test
In In re Flood Litigation, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
expanded on what factors could be important in the reasonable use rule's bal-
ancing test. The court unequivocally stated that the foreseeability of the harm is
one such factor.96 The defendants argued that only adjacent landowners had a
cause of action under the reasonable use rule in Morris.97 The court rejected
this argument and held that one factor to be determined under the reasonable-
ness rule was the foreseeability of the harm.98 The court reasoned that it would
be unjust to adopt an inflexible rule that a defendant could not be held liable to a
non-adjacent landowner, particularly in situations where the topography of the
land made the harm foreseeable.99 In addition, the Flood Litigation Panel certi-
fied two sub-parts of question one which asked whether the balancing test in the
reasonable use standard included such intangibles as the right to peaceful en-
joyment of the land, and whether the social utility of the defendants' activities
included the general population's need for electricity and heat. l°° Again, like in
Whorton, the court stated that because of the fact-specific nature of the inquiry,
it would not try to state with specificity all of the factors to be considered when
determining reasonableness. 10 1 Instead, the court held that juries should con-
sider "all relevant circumstances, including such factors as amount of harm
caused, foreseeablity of harm on part of [the] landowner making [the] alteration
in the flow of surface waters, and the purpose or motive with which the land-
owner acted, etc."' 1 2 This was certainly intended as a non-exhaustive list, and
since the court emphasized that all relevant factors should be considered, the
opinion suggests that the societal benefits from the defendants' operations and
the plaintiffs' right to peaceful enjoyment of their property are relevant factors
that need to be weighed against each other when determining reasonableness.
B. Has West Virginia Created a Separate Cause of Action For Surface
Water Alteration?
The second certified question was whether, in addition to the reasonable
use standard in Morris, the plaintiffs have an additional cause of action upon
96 In Re Flood Litig., 607 S.E.2d at 871.
97 See id. at 870.
98 Id. at 871.
99 Id. at 870.
100 Id. at 87 1.
101 Id. In Whorton, the court also refused to state what factors constituted a reasonable use of
one's property because of the fact-specific nature of the inquiry. See Whorton v. Malone, 549
S.E.2d 57, 64 (W. Va. 2001).
102 Id.
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allegations that the defendants' use of the land is a private nuisance and there-
fore actionable under the standards set forth in Hendricks v. Stalnaker.10 3 The
court refused to answer the question on the grounds that it did not have a suffi-
cient factual record before it, but the court did not preclude a cause of action for
a private nuisance, and it stated that nothing in West Virginia case law excluded
a cause of action in nuisance for surface water diversion.'
14
Because the court insinuated that the plaintiffs have a cause of action
under a private nuisance theory, a discussion of Hendricks is relevant. In
Hendricks, the defendant drilled a water well near the border of his property -
the only feasible place on his property to drill a well. 0 5 The plaintiff wanted to
develop a septic tank, but the only part of his land that was suitable was an area
that was within 100 feet of the defendant's water well and state regulations pre-
vented a septic tank from being developed within 100 feet of a well. 0 6 The
plaintiff sued under the theory that the defendant's water well was a private nui-
sance.10 7 The court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts' definition of
nuisance, holding that the plaintiffs inability to operate a septic system on his
land due to the defendant's water well was a substantial interference with the
plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land. 0 8 In addition, the court held that the
interference was intentional because the defendant did not drill the water well
until after he learned that the plaintiff intended to develop a septic system.°9
Therefore, he knew or should have known that this would have prevented the
plaintiff from developing the septic system. 110 Nonetheless, the court held that
drilling a water well was not an unreasonable use of one's land, so the defendant
was not liable."' In determining whether the conduct was unreasonable, the
court adopted the Restatement's balancing approach and weighed the gravity of
the harm against the social value of the activity alleged to cause the harm." 2
The court noted that both the plaintiffs septic system and the water well were
necessary for both parties to develop the land and that neither party had a practi-
cal and inexpensive alternative. 13 However, in a nuisance cause of action, the
plaintiff has the burden of proving that the gravity of harm outweighs the social
value of the activity alleged to have caused the harm. 14 Since the competing
103 380 S.E.2d 198 (W. Va. 1989).
104 See In re Flood Litig., 607 S.E.2d 863, 871-872 (W. Va. 2004).
105 Hendricks, 380 S.E.2d at 199.
106 Id. at 200.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 202.
109 Id.
110 Id.
it] Id. at 203.
112 Id. at 202.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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interests were equal, and since the plaintiff failed to prove that the benefits
gained from his septic system outweighed the defendant's benefits from drilling
his water well, the plaintiff did not show that the water well was an unreason-
able use of the defendant's land.
115
Despite the inference that the plaintiffs have one cause of action under
the theory of private nuisance and a separate cause of action under Morris's
reasonable use rule, the two approaches are actually the same cause of action.
The surface water doctrine of reasonable use derives from the nuisance area of
tort law.116 In a nuisance cause of action, courts must weigh the benefits of the
land use versus the harm caused by diverted surface water. 117  This balancing
approach avoids the rigidity of the common law and civil law rules and it allows
courts to recognize the right to peaceably enjoy one's land as well as the need to
develop property.1 18 In surface water alteration cases, this balancing approach
became known as the reasonable use rule."19 However, the Court in In re Flood
Litigation suggests that a private nuisance cause of action is somehow separate
from a cause of action for the unreasonable use of one's land. 120 Although it is
115 Id. at 203.
116 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 833 reporter's note, app. at 536 (1979).
Beginning with Basset v. Salisbury Mfg. Company... and going through Sheehan
v. Flynn .... there developed the reasonable use rule, strongly promoted by the
first Restatement .... The 'reasonable use rule' is a rule of tort law applying the
law of nuisance rather than the law of property. The balancing process stated in §§
822-831 [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts] provided the legal concepts for at-
taining a fair adjustment of the conflicting rights of the parties.
Id. (citations omitted).
117 See id.
118 Fairchild, supra note 11, at 1216.
119 See id. Many courts began adding reasonableness criteria to their respective surface water
doctrines, which led some courts to formally adopt a reasonable use rule that applied the tort prin-
ciples of reasonable use and negligence. See id.
120 See In re Flood Litig., 607 S.E.2d 863, 869-72 (W. Va. 2004). The court also attempts to
distinguish a reasonable use cause of action from an ordinary negligence cause of action. See id.
at 872. However, as the Restatement notes, the attempt to distinguish a private nuisance cause of
action from a negligence cause of action has led to confusion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 822 cmt. b. (1979). What such attempts fail to realize is that private nuisance merely
references the interest invaded and negligence references the type of conduct that subjects the
actor to liability for the invasion. Id. In order to have a private nuisance cause of action, there has
to be some sort of tortious activity. Id. at cmt. c. Many began to think of a private nuisance as a
type of liability forming conduct and contrasted it with negligence. Id. However, in a private
nuisance cause of action, it is the invasion in the interest in another person's use and enjoyment of
his or her land that makes it a private nuisance cause of action. Id. But to be actionable, there still
has to be negligent conduct on the part of the person that caused the invasion. Id. In cases where
the invasion is intentional, i.e. Party A intentionally digs a ditch on her land that causes water to
flow onto Party B's land, courts utilize a balancing approach to determine if Party A's conduct is
negligent. See id. However, it is the fact that increased water flow onto Party B's land prevents
her from the use and enjoyment of her land that makes it a private nuisance cause of action. See
id. Therefore, in a private nuisance cause of action, where the invasion is intentional, the balanc-
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uncertain that differing results would be reached under a private nuisance action
as opposed to a reasonable use action, such an approach could potentially lead
to more confusing case law as attorneys and judges would struggle to identify
separate elements for what is essentially the same cause of action.12' To avoid
this result, the court should recognize that the reasonable use tests in Hendricks
and Morris are the same and should formally adopt the Restatement (Second) of
Torts' approach to surface water alteration. This is not a drastic change in West
Virginia case law, but merely a recognition that the reasonable use rule adopted
in Morris is rooted in the legal theory of nuisance. 122 The net result would be
that if the defendant intentionally altered the flow of surface water and damaged
the plaintiffs property, the plaintiff would have to show that the defendant's
conduct was unreasonable under Morris's reasonable use test. 123 If the invasion
was unintentional, the plaintiff would have to show that the defendant's conduct
was nonetheless negligent, reckless, or that the conduct involved an abnormally
dangerous activity. 124
In addition to doctrinal clarity, such an approach could also be useful in
future surface water litigation because the balancing approach in West Virginia
nuisance law is better defined and could help guide parties and courts as to what
factors should be considered when determining reasonableness.
125
C. Distinguishing the Court's Treatment of Causation, Joint and Several
Liability, and the Apportionment of Damages in In re Flood Litigation
The other important issue addressed in In re Flood Litigation is causa-
tion. The plaintiffs appeared to make a joint and several liability argument
when they argued that the defendants should be liable for all damages if they
contributed at all to the flooding. 126 The defendants argued that the potential
ing approach utilized by courts to determine if the conduct is negligent is simply a way to deter-
mine if the defendant "breached" her duty of care to the plaintiff. See generally id.
121 See Morris, 383 S.E.2d 770, 772 (W. Va. 1989) ("Admittedly, our law with regard to a
landowner's liability for altering the surface of his land to change the course or amount of surface
water... is not a model of clarity.").
122 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 833 (1979) (reporter's note). See also Pendergrast
v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787, 796 (N.C. 1977) (recognizing that a cause of action under the reason-
able use rule is a private nuisance cause of action).
123 See id. cmt. b.
124 See id. However, in In re Flood Litigation, the Court held that the defendants' operations
were not abnormally dangerous activities. In re Flood Litig., 607 S.E.2d at 879.
125 For instance, the court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts' definition of what factors
would be important when determining "the gravity of harm and the social value of the activity
alleged to have caused the harm." Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 380 Se. 2d 198, 202 (W. Va. 1989).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979). See also Duff v. Morgantown Energy Asso-
ciates, 421 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1992); Carter v. Monsanto Co., 575 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 2002).
126 See In re Flood Litig., 607 S.E.2d at 879. See also Supplemental Brief of Plaintiffs at 1, In
re Flood Litig., No. 02-C-797 (W. Va. Aug. 3, 2004), http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/clerk/cases/
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harshness of this result is evident because the defendant companies could not
collect from the other tortfeasor, "mother nature." 12 7 The court recognized the
defendants' argument, but it also noted that if a heavy burden is placed on the
plaintiffs to show the portion of the damages that is unforeseeable and fairly
attributable to the defendants, then the defendants might unfairly escape liabil-
ity. 128 In an effort to strike a compromise between these competing interests, the
court held that
[W]here a rainfall event of an unusual and unforeseeable nature
combines with a defendant's actionable conduct to cause flood
damage, and where it is shown that a discrete portion of the
damage complained of was unforeseeable and solely the result
of such event and in no way attributable to the defendant's con-
duct, the defendant is liable only for the damages that are fairly
attributable to the defendant's conduct. 1
29
However, the court held that the defendants have the burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence the damages that are not the defendants' re-
sponsibility, and if they cannot do so, then they are liable for all of the dam-
ages. 130
The plaintiffs' argument that the defendants should be liable for the en-
tirety of the damages if they contributed at all misconstrues the principles of
joint and several liability.131 In order to hold multiple defendants joint and sev-
erally liable, all of the defendants' negligence must have been a legal cause of
an indivisible injury. 132 The primary test for factual cause is the "but for" analy-
sis, which requires that the negligence must be that which produced the wrong
complained of, and without which, the wrong would not have occurred. 3 3 In
this case, there are arguably two alleged causes - mother nature and the altera-
tion of land surfaces. 134 Obviously, but for mother nature, the floods and ensuing
damage would not have occurred. However, since it is undeniable that a large
amount of flooding would have occurred absent the defendants' activities, it
FloodLitigation/31688PlaintiffSupp.pdf. Plaintiffs argued that "[m]any states, including West
Virginia, explicitly hold that when an act of nature concurs with an act of man in causing nui-
sance, the human actor is responsible for the entirety of the harm." Id.
127 See id. See also Supplemental Brief of Defendants at 12, In re Flood Litig., No. 02-C-797
(W. Va. Aug. 2, 2004), http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/clerk/cases/FloodLitigation/31688 Defen-
dantSupp.pdf. "It is axiomatic that God or Mother Nature cannot be a tortfeasor." Id.
128 See id.
129 See id.
130 See id.
131 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 879 (1979).
132 See id. See also Wilkinson v. Duff, 575 S.E.2d 335, 341 (W. Va. 2002).
133 Wilkinson, 575 S.E.2d at 341.
134 See In re Flood Litig., 607 S.E.2d at 878-79.
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follows that the defendants' activities are not a but-for cause of the entire
amount of harm, so joint and several liability would not apply. 135 The court
correctly rejected this particular argument and recognized that the defendants
should only be held liable for those damages that they negligently caused. 136
The defendants have the burden of proving that the damages are capable of be-
ing apportioned, and if they fail to prove that the damages can be divided, then
they are liable for the entirety of the harm. 1
37
Actually, West Virginia follows a similar approach in "crashworthi-
ness" cases.138 Crashworthiness cases are those in which the plaintiff is in-
volved in an automobile accident caused by one tortfeasor and suffers enhanced
injury due to a product defect in the car which made it "uncrashworthy." 139
Typically, the plaintiff would have suffered some injury absent the alleged de-
fect, but the plaintiff alleges that the product defect enhanced the injury suf-
fered. 4° In such cases, defendant auto manufacturers can limit their liability by
showing that the damages are capable of being apportioned. 141 If the defendant
can successfully show that the damages are divisible, then basic causation prin-
ciples limit the defendant's portion of the damages to the increased harm caused
by the defect. 142 However, if the auto manufacturer is unable to prove that the
damages are capable of being apportioned, then it is liable for all of the plain-
tiffs harm. 143 In West Virginia crashworthiness cases, whether a harm is di-
visible is a question of law for the judge. 144 This suggests that whether the de-
135 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 879.
136 See In Re Flood Litig., 607 S.E.2d at 879. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. a (2000). The policy underlying division by causation is
that no person should be held liable for a harm that he or she did not cause. Id.
137 See In Re Flood Litig., 607 S.E.2d at 879. This position is also consistent with the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts' approach to apportionment of causation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. h. (2000) ("A party alleging that damages are
divisible has the burden to prove that they are divisible.").
138 See generally Johnson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 438 S.E.2d 28, 32 (W. Va. 1993). In Tracy v.
Cottrell, 524 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1999), the plaintiff was killed in a car crash, and his heirs al-
leged that his death was caused by the collision and a defective seatbelt. The court held that in
order to find the manufacturer liable, the plaintiff only needed to prove that the defective seatbelt
was a factor in causing the defendant's death. Id. at 894. Once the plaintiff made this prima facie
showing, the defendant could limit its liability by showing that the damages were capable of being
apportioned. ld.
139 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. d(1) (P.F.D. No. 1 2005).
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 16 (1998).
140 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 16 (1998).
141 See id.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See Tracy v. Cottrell, 524 S.E.2d 879, 897 (W. Va. 1999) But c.f. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. f. (2000) (stating that whether damages can be
divided by causation is a question of fact).
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fendants can prove that the flood damages are divisible might be a question of
law for the judge in the flood litigation cases as well. However, given the
heavy rain, the topography of the land, and the scope of damages, proving by
clear and convincing evidence what flood damages are capable of being appor-
tioned could be difficult.
In summary, after In re Flood Litigation, non-adjacent landowners are
not precluded from bringing a cause of action against a defendant under the rea-
sonable use rule, and the Court stated that foreseeability of the harm was one of
the factors in the reasonable use test. 145 Additionally, the Court suggested that
the plaintiffs may be able to bring a cause of action under the private nuisance
theory as well.'46 This Note argues that the reasonable use rule actually derived
from the nuisance theory of tort law and that the two causes of action are one
and the same. Although more of a practical matter, suggesting that the reason-
able use rule and the private nuisance theory are different could cause attorneys
and judges to attempt to formulate separate tests for what is essentially the same
cause of action. In addition, the Court correctly held that the defendants would
only be held liable for the portion of the damages which they caused.147 How-
ever, the Court held that the defendants must prove by clear and convincing
evidence those damages that they did not cause or else bear the entire liabil-
ity.1 48 This could be a difficult burden to overcome.
IV. WEST VIRGINIA SHOULD WEIGH PUBLIC AND SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS,
INCLUDING ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS, WHEN DETERMINING WHETHER
DEFENDANTS OWE A DUTY OF CARE TO THE PLAINTIFFS IN FLOOD LITIGATION
CASES
One aspect in the pending flood litigation that distinguishes these cases
from other surface water alteration cases is the scope of the damage and the
large number of claimants. In fact, West Virginia cases as well as surface water
alteration cases in other jurisdictions generally contemplate damages to only
neighboring lands.14 9 However, many claimants in the pending litigation are
145 See In re Flood Litig., 607 S.E.2d 863, 870-71 (W. Va. 2004).
146 See id. at 872.
147 See id. at 879.
148 See id.
149 See Jordan v. City of Brenwood, 26 S.E. 266, 268 (W. Va. 1896) ("If a city, in changing
grade, causes water collecting on its streets ... to go on adjoining land, it is not liable for dam-
ages.") (emphasis added). See also Mason v. City of Bluefield, 141 S.E. 782, 782 (W. Va. 1928)
("A city is liable... to a property owner in collecting surface water and casting it in a mass .. . on
his land by raising the grade of an adjoining street.") (emphasis added); see also Morris Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Piddy, 383 S.E.2d 770, 770 (W. Va. 1989) ("landowner ... is entitled to take only
such steps as are reasonable . . .to the adjoining landowners) (emphasis added); Zollinger v.
Carter, 837 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tenn. 1992) ("a wrongful interference with the natural drainage of
surface water causing injury to an adjoining landowner constitutes an actionable nuisance.") (em-
phasis added).
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non-adjacent landowners. As mentioned above, the Court held that the rea-
sonable use rule did not preclude non-adjacent landowners from bringing a
cause of action because one of the factors in the reasonable use balancing test
was the foreseeability of the harm.1 5' In certain circumstances, the Court stated,
the specific topography of the land could have made flood damage to those non-
adjacent claimants foreseeable. 52 The Court stated that another element of the
cause of action, the defendants' duty of care to the plaintiffs, would also be
predicated upon foreseeability of the harm.' 5
3
Duty is an essential element in any tort action, 54 and West Virginia rec-
ognizes that duty must be proven in surface water alteration cases,155 as well as
in nuisance cases. 156 Yet duty is an element that has confounded courts and
commentators alike. 157 Generally, legal duty is defined by the relationship be-
15o See In re Flood Litig., 607 S.E.2d at 870 (arguing whether a cause of action existed for non-
adjacent landowners under the reasonable use theory).
151 See id.
152 See id.
153 Id. at 867 ("The ultimate test of the existence of a duty to use care is found in the foresee-
ability that harm may result if it is not exercised. The test is, would the ordinary man [or woman]
in the defendant's position, knowing what he [or she] knew or should have known, anticipate that
harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result."). Actually, the Court addressed
duty in a separate certified question that asked whether the plaintiffs had a common law negli-
gence cause of action against the defendants in addition to the reasonable use rule and the private
nuisance causes of action. Id. However, liability under both the reasonable use rule and a private
nuisance cause of action (which this Note argues are the same cause of action) depend upon the
presence of some type of tortious conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. c.
(1979). Therefore, a duty is required no matter under what theory of liability a cause of action is
brought. See Whorton v. Malone, 549 S.E.2d 57, 64 (W. Va. 2001). See also Carter v. Monsanto
Co., 575 S.E.2d 342, 347 (W. Va. 2002). It is plausible that duty will be based on foreseeability
of the harm for all causes of action in the flood litigation.
154 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 73 (2001) ("The existence of such a duty is imperative to a
negligence cause of action, essential to a finding of negligence, and a prerequisite to any negli-
gence action. Thus, the threshold question in a negligence action is whether the defendant owed a
legal duty to the plaintiff.").
155 See Whorton v. Malone, 549 S.E.2d 57, 63-64 (W. Va. 2001).
156 See Carter, 575 S.E.2d at 347. Despite the court's insinuation that a separate cause of ac-
tion exists in nuisance, the law of surface water alteration in West Virginia is grounded in nui-
sance law. See discussion supra Part III.A.
157 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, (West Pub-
lishing Co.5th ed. 1984). Historically, in early English law there was little consideration of duty,
and defendants were exposed to almost limitless liability without any regard for their culpability.
See id. However, beginning in the Industrial Revolution, English courts began to develop the idea
of duty, which they described as a sort of relationship between the parties, and without such rela-
tionship, there could be no duty. Id. It is quite plausible that courts developed the concept of duty
in an effort to limit the liability that the growing industries faced. Id. The first English case to
address duty, Heaven v. Pender, held that a duty arises whenever a person is placed in a situation
where he or she "would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own
conduct with regard to those circumstances, he would cause danger of injury to the person." Id.
(quoting Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (C.A. 1883)). This is an oft quoted phrase in case law,
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tween individuals; 158 "it is a question of whether the defendant is under any ob-
ligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff."' 59  Courts impose upon indi-
viduals a duty to conduct themselves or exercise their own rights in a manner
that does not injure others or prevent others from enjoying their own rights. 160
Conversely, there are certain situations when the defendant is under no obliga-
tion to a particular person, and even though the defendant's conduct falls short
of the required level of care and injures the other person, the law imposes no
duty on the defendant and he or she is not liable for that person's injuries. 161
Also, apart from the other elements of negligence - breach, causation, and dam-
ages - duty is always a question of law for a judge.162
Arguably, there are three ways in which courts could define duty in the
pending flood litigation. Under one approach, courts could develop a bright line
rule that was somewhat less restrictive than "only adjoining landowners." For
instance, courts could say that the defendant companies only owed a duty to
landowners within a half mile of their properties. 63 Such a rule would have the
advantage of promoting judicial efficiency and would address crushing liability
concerns raised by the defendants, although it could potentially exclude some
even though ten years after Heaven, the judge that authored the opinion had to constrict his defini-
tion of duty because it was too broad. Id. Courts struggled with defining the contours of duty in
1883 and continue to struggle with defining duty today. See JOHN W. WADE, PROSSER, WADE AND
SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 386 (The Foundation Press 9th Ed. 1994) (1951);
See also Charles 0. Gregory, Gratuitous Undertakings and the Duty of Care, 1 DEP. L. REv. 30
(1951).
158 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 40 (2000).
159 Keeton, supra note 157. "The statement that there is or is not a duty [of care] begs the
essential question-whether the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection against the de-
fendant's conduct." Id. "It is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis
in itself." Id. Duty is an expression of "the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead
the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." Id.
160 See 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 40 (2000). See also Keeton, supra note 157. ("Duty is imposed
upon individuals to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the appar-
ent risk.")
161 See Wade, supra note 157, at 385. For example, courts often limit duty in cases where the
defendant is accused of causing a bystander emotional distress as a result of having witnessed an
accident. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). In emotional distress cases such
as Thing, the defendant's negligence injured someone and an innocent bystander suffered emo-
tional trauma from witnessing the accident. There is no question that the defendant's negligence
"injured" the bystander by causing him or her to view the accident, but courts have often held that
in such circumstances, there is not a sufficient relationship between the defendant and the inno-
cent bystander to create a duty of care. See id. at 877-78.
162 Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 578 (W. Va. 2000).
163 Such a bright-line rule would be similar to the "New York fire rule" that was first estab-
lished in Ryan v. New York Central Railroad. See Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently
Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1513, 1530 (1985). The New York
fire rule limited liability to only the first property damaged by fire. David A. Logan, Masked
Media: Judges, Juries, and the Law of Surreptitious News Gathering, 83 IOWA L. REV. 161, n.357
(1997).
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meritorious claims. 64 Although the Court did not preclude this rule, such a
bright-line rule seems contrary to the spirit of In re Flood Litigation.165 Alterna-
tively, courts could say that duty is dependent on foreseeability of the harm,
which the Court suggested is the primary factor in determining whether the de-
fendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs.1 66 However, this Note will argue
that predicating duty solely on foreseeability of the harm could lead to almost
limitless exposure to liability. 67 A third approach, and one advocated in this
Note, would be to include foreseeability of harm in a duty analysis, but to also
include social, public, and economic policy concerns when determining whether
the defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs.
A. Other Courts Have Considered Social, Public, and Economic Policy
When Determining Duty
When determining whether the defendant is under a legal duty to the
plaintiff, courts have addressed concepts of morality and logic, as well as con-
sidered the social consequences of imposing a duty. 168 Early in the twentieth
century, Justice Cardozo recognized that one of the important public policy con-
cerns in a duty analysis should be the economic implications of expanding duty
to a large class of plaintiffs. 169 In a famous New York case, H.R. Moch Co., Inc.
v. Rensselaer Water Co.,170 Justice Cardozo advocated limiting duty in order to
prevent the defendant from being subjected to enormous liability. 71 In Moch,
the defendant entered into a contract with the city of Rensselaer to supply water
to the city, including supplying the water supply at the city's fire hydrants.
172
However, when the plaintiff's warehouse caught fire, insufficient water pressure
at the hydrant caused the warehouse to burn. 73 Justice Cardozo denied recov-
164 The New York fire rule was adopted to deal with the crushing liability concerns of holding
someone liable for all fire damage negligently caused that were present in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. See Rabin, supra note 163, at 1530. Because of the prevalence of
wooden buildings and coal stoves during that time period, fire spread rapidly. See Id. Holding
someone liable for all fire damage negligently caused could thus have been economically ruinous
for someone. Thus, New York created an aberrational rule that limited liability to only the first
building damaged in a fire. See Logan, supra note 163.
165 The Court said that an inflexible rule that prevented non-adjacent landowners from suing
would be inequitable, and although it did not specifically rule out a "more generous" bright-line
rule, it stands to reason that courts would nonetheless reject such a rule for the same policy rea-
sons. See generally In re Flood Litig., 607 S.E.2d 863, 870 (W. Va. 2004).
166 Id. at 873.
167 See discussion infra Part 1V.B. 1.
168 See 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 40 (2000). See also 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 87 (2001).
169 See H.R. Moch Co., Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 899 (N.Y. 1928).
170 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
171 Id. at 899.
172 Id. at 896.
173 Id. at 896-97.
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ery on the basis that there was no privity of contract between the water company
and the individual residents of the city. 174 However, Cardozo also held that the
plaintiff did not have a common law negligence claim against the defendant
either because the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff. 75 Cardozo held that
to extend the zone of duty to every citizen who might have benefited from the
supply of water exposed the defendant to an unfair amount of liability. 76 In
rendering his opinion, Justice Cardozo also considered the broader economic
consequences of expanding duty. 177 Expanding duty, Cardozo thought, would
mean that everyone making a contract would assume a duty not only to the con-
tractee, but also to an indefinite number of potential beneficiaries of the con-
tract.'78 Such a result would "unduly and indefinitely" extend liability, and pol-
icy considerations justify limiting the defendant's duty. 179
Since Moch, New York has extended this theme of balancing competing
public policy concerns when determining whether a duty existed. 80 In one no-
table case, Strauss v. Belle Realty Company,18 1 an electric utility company s
gross negligence caused a twenty-five hour blackout in New York City.'82 Dur-
ing the blackout, an elderly tenant lost his water due to the power outage and
suffered injuries while walking through a dark part of his apartment building to
174 Id at 897.
175 See id. at 898.
176 See id. at 899.
177 Justice Cardozo stated:
The dealer in coal who is to supply fuel for a shop must then answer to the
customers if fuel is lacking. The manufacturer of goods, who enters upon the
performance of his contract, must answer... not only to the buyer, but to
those who to his knowledge are looking to the buyer-for their own sources of
supply.
Id.
178 Id.
179 See id.
18o See, e.g., Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v. Y.B.H. Realty Corp., 556 N.E.2d 1093, 1096 (N.Y.
1990) (determining that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff, in part because imposing a
duty on the defendant would expose it to limitless liability and cause it to pass along its increased
costs to the general public); Palka v. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 634 N.E.2d 189, 192 (N.Y.
1994) (when determining duty, courts need to look at "logic, science, weighty competing socio-
economic policies and sometimes contractual assumptions of responsibility. These sources con-
tribute to pinpointing and apportioning of societal risks and to an allocation of burdens of loss and
reparation on a fair, prudent basis"). See generally Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors, Inc.,
773 N.E.2d 485 (N.Y. 2002). In these three cases, the defendants had entered into contracts with
the plaintiffs, and the court in each case held that there was no privity of contract to find a duty of
care existed. However, each case also discusses other policy considerations, such as economic
implications, when determining whether a duty of care exists. But see Warren A. Seavey, The
Waterworks Cases and Stare Decisis, 66 HARv. L. REV. 84 (1952).
181 482 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 1985).
182 Id. at 35.
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obtain water. 183 Again, the court held that the harm was foreseeable, but it was
the court's obligation when determining duty to limit the legal consequences of
wrongs to a controllable degree and to protect against crushing exposure to li-
ability. 184 When "fixing the bounds of that duty, not only logic and science, but
policy considerations play an important role.' 85 If the court held that the elec-
tric company had a duty to every customer for every harm suffered during the
blackout, then its potential liability would be incalculable. 86 The court also
considered in its analysis the general population's need for electric service., 87
Exposing the company to such a large liability might inhibit its ability to supply
that service, and the benefit of curtailing the company's exposure outweighed
any benefit gained from finding the company liable to every customer whom it
might have harmed through its negligence. 188
Other jurisdictions besides New York have considered the economic
implications of expanding duty. For example, Louisiana held that it is important
to look at the economic impact on employers when deciding whether store own-
ers have a duty to provide security for their patrons. 89 The issue probably sur-
faces most frequently, though, when the defendant is a public utility com-
pany.' 90 In Florida, a court held that an electric company did not owe a duty to
a bicyclist who was killed by a motorist who could not see him because the elec-
tric company's negligence caused a street light to be inoperative.' 9' California
has also held that electric companies owe no duty to motorists in automobile
accidents caused by inoperative street lights, even when the electric company is
under a contractual obligation to maintain the light.' 92 In Mississippi, a court
held that an electric company owed no duty to an employee of a manufacturing
183 Id.
184 Id. at 36.
185 Id. (quoting De Angelis v. Lutheran Medical Center, 58 N.Y.2d 1053, 1055 (1983)).
186 See id. at 37.
187 Id.
188 See id. at 38.
189 See Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So. 2d 762, 768 (La. 1999). See also San Benito
Bank & Trust Co. v. Landiar Travels, 31 S.W.3d 312, 321 (Tex. 2000) (holding that when deter-
mining whether a new common law duty should be created, among other considerations, courts
should consider the social, economic, and political implications of placing the burden on the de-
fendant).
190 See generally Karen L. Ellmore, Annotation, Liability of Electric Utility to Nonpatron for
Interruption or Failure of Power, 54 A.L.R. 4th 667 (1987).
191 Levy v. Fla. Power & Light Company, 798 So. 2d 778, 780 (Fla. 2001). See also Arenado
v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 523 So. 2d 628, 629 (Fla. 1998). In Levy, an electric company's negli-
gence caused a traffic light not to work properly. Levy, 798 So. 2d at 780. The plaintiff was
killed crossing the street by a motorist who could not see him due to the malfunctioning street
lights. Id. The court held that the electric company owed no duty to the pedestrian. Id.
192 White v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 25 Cal. App. 4th. 442,451 (Cal. App. 2 Dis. 1994).
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plant when the utility's negligence disrupted the electricity causing an employee
to stumble in the darkness and fatally fall into a vat of acid.1
93
In many of these cases, the courts noted that the injuries were arguably
foreseeable consequences of the defendants' negligence, but that policy reasons
nonetheless justified limiting the defendants' duty and shielding them from ex-
cessive liability. 194 Important here, especially in the utility cases, is that the
courts not only looked at the economic consequences to the defendant compa-
nies, but they also looked at the economic effect that expanding duty might have
on the general public, such as possibly causing higher utility rates.195
In addition, the courts seemed to limit duty to events that the defendants
were able to control. 196 In White v. Southern California Edison Co.,19 7 a Cali-
fornia court listed examples of when an electric company could be held liable,
such as when it places a utility pole too close to a road or when it negligently
allows high voltage power lines to fall, but distinguished negligently caused
power outages from these situations. 98 The court in White stated that when
making this distinction, it "must consider the cost of imposing this liability on
public utilities, the current public utility rate structures, the large numbers of
streetlights, [and] the likelihood that streetlights will become periodically inop-
erable."' 99 White suggests that an electric company would be held liable for
placing a light pole too close to the road and injuring a motorist, but that it
would not be held liable if its negligence resulted in a power outage that caused
the motorist to wreck due to the lack of operable street lights.200 In the first ex-
ample, the company could control where it placed the light pole, but it arguably
could not control what accidents occurred during inevitable power outages. 2° 1
Many of the policy arguments for limiting utility companies' exposure
to liability could also apply to the defendant companies in the flood litigation.
Several defendant companies in the pending flood litigation provide the natural202
resources for which utility companies rely. Therefore, expanding the defen-
193 Mullican v. Meridian Light and Ry. Co., 83 So. 816, 819 (Miss. 1920).
194 See, e.g., Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 36 (N.Y. 1985) (foreseeability is not
dispositive of duty). See also White, 25 Cal. App. 4th. at 450 ("we must take into consideration
not only the foreseeability of the harm but also the burdens to be imposed against a defendant").
195 See White, 25 Cal. App. 4th. at 450-51 (looking at the existing public utility rate structure as
a factor in imposing a duty. See also Keeton, supra note 157, at § 4 (the capacity to bear or dis-
tribute loss is a factor to consider in allocating the risk).
196 See, e.g., Strauss, 482 N.E.2d at 36 (courts have the duty in fixing the orbit of duty to "limit
the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree").
197 25 Cal. App. 4th 442 (Cal. 1994).
198 Id. at 448-51.
199 Id. at 45 1.
200 See id. at 448-51.
201 See id. See generally Strauss, 482 N.E.2d at 34.
202 For example, coal accounts for fifty percent of the electricity produced nationwide, and it
accounts for almost ninety percent of the nation's fossil energy reserves. See WEST VIRGINIA
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dants' duty and exposing them to such a large liability could cause their losses
to eventually be shifted to the general public in the form of utility rate in-
creases. 20 3 Exposing the defendant companies to large liability could also cur-
tail their ability to extract resources, which could then affect society's need for
the resources that the defendant companies produce.204 The defendant compa-
nies' operations sometimes necessarily cover large areas, so their potential li-
ability for flooding that occurs during a heavy rainstorm could be quite mas-
sive. 20 5 Additionally, for the defendant companies to operate - for coal mines to
mine coal, for natural gas companies to extract gas, for logging companies to
timber land - it is necessary to alter the landscape. Also, heavy rains, and thus
flooding, are inevitable, and the extent to which the defendants could control the
amount of damages that occurred during the flooding could be a factor in deter-
mining whether the defendants owed a duty to certain plaintiffs.
B. Duty Analysis in West Virginia: Social, Public, and Economic Policy
Considerations Should Factor into the Court's Analysis
1. The Duty Analysis in Aikens v. Debow
20 6
The idea of protecting defendants from random and unpredictable liabil-
ity by limiting duty is not a new idea in West Virginia.20 7 In Aikens v. Debow,
the court held that social and public policy considerations, particularly the need
COAL ASSOCIATION, COAL FACTS 7-16 (2004), http://www.wvcoal.com/resources/pdfs/coalfacts
2004.pdf. In addition, it is estimated that U.S. natural gas consumption for electricity will double
in the next twenty-two years. Gayle Ehrenman, Mechanical Engineering, Vol. 125, Issue 4,
(April 2003). Natural gas currently represents twenty-four percent of all energy consumed in the
United States, according to the Energy Information Agency. By 2020, it is expected to represent
twenty-six percent and will account for thirty-three percent of all electricity consumed. Id.
203 See KEETON, supra note 157 § 93. Relieving the electric company of liability may leave the
loss on the shoulders of the individual plaintiff, who may be ruined by it... "[b]ut the imposition
of tort liability on those who must render continuous service of this kind to all who apply for it
under all kinds of circumstances could [also] be ruinous and the expense of litigation and settling
claims over the issue of whether or not there was negligence could be a greater burden to the rate
payer than can be socially justified." Id.
204 See Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 38 (N.Y. 1985) (discussing how exposing
an electric company to a large liability might curtail its ability to provide electricity, which would
adversely affect the general population).
205 For example, the largest underground mine in West Virginia, the McElroy Mine, encom-
passes some 6,791,716 acres. WEST VIRGINIA COAL ASSOCIATION, COAL FACTS, supra note 202,
at 2.
206 541 S.E.2d 576 (W. Va. 2000).
207 See id. See generally Harris v. Martin, Inc., 513 S.E.2d 170 (W. Va. 1998) (abrogated by
Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 581 (W. Va. 2000)); Miller v. Whitworth, 455 S.E.2d 821, 825
(W. Va. 1995) (holding that a landlord did not owe a duty of care to protect a tenant from the
criminal acts of others because, in part, of "the economic consequences of imposing such a duty");
Strahin v. Cleavenger, 603 S.E.2d 197, 212 (W. Va. 2004) (Maynard, J., dissenting).
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to restrict the limitless expansion of duty, necessitated limiting the defendant's
duty to the plaintiff when he suffered only economic damages.2 °8 In Aikens, the
defendant was a truck driver who wrecked his truck on a bridge overpass, caus-
ing it to close for nineteen days. 209 The plaintiff, who owned a motel near the
overpass, lost business during the time it took to repair the bridge and sued the
defendant for lost income.21 ° In determining whether the defendant owed a duty
to the plaintiff, the court stated that "the ultimate test of the existence of a duty
to use care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if it is not exer-
cised.",21' Yet the court stated that in addition to foreseeability, the existence of
duty also involves policy considerations such as the "likelihood of the injury,
the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it, and the consequences of
placing the burden on the defendant., 21 2 In Aikens, the plaintiff suffered only
economic damages, and although the damages were caused by the defendant's
negligence, public policy considerations justified restricting duty in such situa-
tions, particularly in the absence of physical damages or a special relationship
213between the parties.
In reaching its decision, the court in Aikens noted that predicating duty
solely on foreseeablity was insufficient because legal liability does not necessar-
214ily extend to all foreseeable consequences of an accident. The court warned
that to only look at foreseeability could transform duty analysis into a logical
connection test that would eventually involve nothing more than a watered
down maxim that if a party is injured by the conduct of another, then there must
have been a duty to avoid such conduct.21 5 Rather, courts must draw a line be-
208 Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 590-9 1.
209 Id. at 579.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 581.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 589-90.
214 Id. at 581-83. See also Harris v. Martin, Inc., 513 S.E.2d 170, 176 (W. Va. 1998) (May-
nard, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for placing too much emphasis on foreseeability when
analyzing the duty element). Other courts have also warned that solely focusing on foreseeability
when defining duty could expose defendants to almost limitless liability. See, e.g., Thing v. La
Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 821 (Cal. 1989). See also Newton v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 228 Cal.
Rptr. 890, 893 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (overruled on other grounds) ("the quest for foreseeabil-
ity is endless because foreseeability, like light, travels endlessly in a vacuum").
215 See also John C. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, The Moral of McPherson, 146 U. PA. L.
REv. 1733, 1776 (1993).
The courts' uncertainty about what to do with duty is displayed in their uneven
use of the concept of foreseeability. Sometimes foreseeability is deemed part
of the issue of breach and thus left to the jury. Other times it is deemed the es-
sence of duty and kept for the courts. Still other times it is left for the jury un-
der the heading of proximate cause. What one court finds unforeseeable as a
matter of law, another court will find foreseeable as a matter of law. Foresee-
ability is sometimes a necessary condition of liability, sometimes a sufficient
condition, and sometimes merely a factor. Far from cleaning up duty-
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tween the competing policy considerations of providing a remedy to everyone
who is injured and preventing exposure to liability without limit.216
2. The Duty Analysis in Aikens Should Not Be Limited to Cases
Involving Only Economic Damages
Aikens must be taken in the context that it involved only economic
damages, and courts have been extremely reluctant to extend liability when only
economic damages are involved. 217 The rationale is based upon the element of
remoteness between the injury and the act of negligence that is the source of the
injury.218 Further, it is feared that permitting economic damages would lead to
theoretically limitless liability.219 Yet nothing in Aikens suggests that the actual
duty analysis in Aikens should be so narrowly restricted. 220 Aikens' duty analy-
analysis, the concept of foreseeability illustrates the confusion courts currently
experience dealing with the duty element.
Id. at 1775.
The use of a "foreseeability" analysis in West Virginia also varies. Foreseeability has been re-
ferred to as important in determining whether the defendant owed a duty of care, see, e.g., Elliott
v. Schoolcraft, 576 S.E.2d 796, 805 (W. Va. 2002) (Davis, C.J., concurring); foreseeability has
been categorized as an important consideration in determining proximate cause, see, e.g., Mays v.
Chang, 579 S.E.2d 561, 565 (W. Va. 2003); and the court has even categorized foreseeability as a
separate element in a negligence action, see, e.g., McGraw v. Norfolk & Western Railway. Co.,
500 S.E.2d 300, 305 (W. Va. 1997).
216 Aikens, 542 S.E.2d at 583. See also 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 87 (2001) (quoted in
Harris, 513 S.E.2d at 176 (Maynard, J., dissenting)
A line must be drawn between the competing policy considerations of provid-
ing a remedy to everyone who is injured and of extending exposure to tort li-
ability almost without limit. It is always tempting to impose new duties and,
concomitantly, liabilities, regardless of the economic and social burden. Thus,
the courts have generally recognized that public policy and social considera-
tions, as well as foreseeability, are important factors in determining whether a
duty will be held to exist in a particular situation.
Id.
217 See generally Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Hint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927) (holding that a
dry dock owner could not recover for lost use of a vessel because of a third party's act of negli-
gence during the ship's refurbishing). In this decision, Justice Holmes articulated the rationale
that a tortfeasor cannot be held liable for indirect economic damages. Id. See also, Michael P.
Sullivan, Annotation, Robins Dry Dock Limiting Economic Recovery for Economic Losses Due to
Unintentional Maritime Torts, 88 A.L.R. Fed. 295 (1988). However, the Robins rule has been
criticized on the grounds that such a rigid rule unnecessarily prevents innocent victims who would
otherwise have a cause of action from being compensated for their losses and that it causes courts
to manufacture exceptions to the rule that inevitably mitigate any judicial efficiency that the rule
was intended to create. See, e.g., La. ex rel. Guste, Jr. v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1035-36
(5th Cir. 1985) (Rubin, J., dissenting).
218 Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 584.
219 Id. at 586.
220 See id. at 581 ("the existence of duty also involves policy considerations underlying the core
issue of the scope of the legal system's protection").
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sis illustrates a balancing approach that recognizes the need to authorize recov-
ery for meritorious claims while also providing a barrier against limitless liabil-
ity. 22 1 The type of damages involved is only one factor that courts should con-
sider when determining whether a duty exists in a particular circumstance. 2
The policy considerations involved in Aikens - the social consequences of ex-
tending duty, the economic consequences to the defendant, both parties' ability
to bear the loss - do not change merely because the plaintiffs suffered real prop-
erty damage as opposed to only economic damages. To say that the defendant
owed the plaintiff a duty merely because the plaintiff suffered property damage
as opposed to only economic damage leads to the same result the court cau-
tioned against in Aikens - because there was an injury, there must be a duty.223
3. Applying the Duty Analysis in Aikens to the Flood Cases in
Southern West Virginia
In the pending flood cases, when determining whether the defendants
owe a duty to particular plaintiffs, courts should consider not only the foresee-
ability of the harm, but also social and public policy ramifications of expanding
the defendants' duty of care.224 These social and public policy considerations
should include "the likelihood of the injury, the magnitude of the burden of
guarding against it, and the consequences of placing that burden on the defen-
dant. 225
This is not meant to be a draconian rule that only permits liability for
adjacent landowners, nor is it meant to simply curtail duty when expanding duty
would result in crushing economic liability for defendants.226 Indeed, such an
inflexible rule could have the negative effect of actually rewarding defendants
whose negligence affects many people as opposed to just a few.227 Rather this is
meant to be a balancing approach that recognizes the need to compensate the
victims for meritorious claims while protecting defendants against limitless li-
ability.
228
221 See id. at 590.
222 See id. at 581-82
In the area of harm to one's body, the reach of what is recoverable is very
great. Where one's property is injured, the extent of legal liability is consid-
erable, but not to the same extent as with bodily injury. Where pure economic
loss is at issue ... the reach of legal liability is quite limited ....
Id.
223 Id. at 583.
224 id. at 581.
225 Id.
226 See Strauss v. Belle Realty, 482 N.E.2d 34, 38 (N.Y. 1985) (Meyer, J., dissenting).
227 See id.
228 See Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 590.
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Under such an approach, foreseeability of the harm is not eliminated
from the analysis, and indeed, in some instances the specific topography might
make the damage so likely to occur that a court might very well find that the
defendant owes a duty to such a plaintiff.229 However, this approach also per-
mits a judge to consider policy concerns, such as the feasibility of protecting
against such a disaster, the defendant industries' impact on the area, the number
of persons employed in those industries, society's need for the resources pro-
duced by the defendants, the likelihood that the losses might be passed on to the
general public in the form of utility rate increases, as well as who is better able
to bear the cost of the harm. 230 Finally, such an approach does not preclude a
judge from factoring into the analysis the type of damages involved.231
Some might argue that the balancing approach merely permits a judge
to arbitrarily draw a line that would certainly preclude some plaintiffs from re-
covering against the defendants.232 However, the fact remains that duty is a
necessary element in tort law, and judges have the burden of defining the exis-
tence and extent of that duty.2 33 Furthermore, while the temptation may be to let
a case proceed to the jury in every instance of resulting harm, judges must also
consider whether the consequences of such an approach would be socially and
economically ruinous.234 The balancing approach to duty defined in Aikens is
an equitable approach that considers the plaintiffs' right to recovery, the impor-
tance of the defendant industries to the already burdened part of the state, and
the consequences that expanding the duty of care might have on the industries as
well as the general public.
V. CONCLUSION
Thousands of people were seriously affected during the floods on July
8, 2001 in southern West Virginia. Many had their homes destroyed and have
had to relocate, and the economic consequences of this single natural disaster
have been estimated at around $500 million.235 However, holding the defendant
229 See In Re Flood Litig., 607 S.E.2d 863, 870 (W. Va. 2004).
230 As part of this consideration, courts might consider that the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA) has already paid over $330 million to victims of the 2001 and 2002 floods
in southern West Virginia. Editorial, Floods, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, June 17, 2004, at A4. In
addition, one of the plaintiffs attorneys, Stuart Calwell, has indicated that one of the defendant
companies has sufficient liability insurance to handle whatever the outcome of the litigation.
Terry, supra note 7, at 21.
231 See Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 582.
232 Tort scholar William Prosser was exceptionally critical of duty. See Goldberg & Zipursky,
supra note 215 at 1758. Prosser felt that any notion of duty was helplessly vague, and that a court
desirous of finding liability could always find the necessary relationship to impose a duty. Id.
233 See Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 583.
234 Id.
235 See Coleman, supra note 2, at Cl.
[Vol. 108
32
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 108, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol108/iss1/8
IN RE FLOOD LITIGATION
companies liable for all of the damages could be economically ruinous for them
and could further worsen the conditions in that region. In addition, the implica-
tions of the pending flood litigation will not be limited to only the July 8, 2001
floods, as hundreds of plaintiffs have already filed lawsuits for damages sus-
tained during subsequent floods. Holding the defendant companies liable for all
damages incurred each time there is a flood creates an unstable economic envi-
ronment.236
In order to find the defendant companies liable, courts must first deter-
mine that the companies owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs. The court sug-
gested that duty in these cases will be predicated upon the foreseeability of the
harm. In other jurisdictions though, courts have considered social and public
policy considerations, as well as the economic consequences of expanding duty,
when deciding whether a duty existed. This Note argues that West Virginia
courts should address these same considerations when determining whether the
defendants owe a duty to the plaintiffs in the pending flood litigation. Such an
approach allows courts the flexibility to balance the plaintiffs' need to collect
damages for meritorious claims while also protecting the defendants from limit-
less liability.
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236 See Terry, supra note 7, at 21.
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